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MARKETING RESORT TIMESHARES: THE
RULES OF THE GAME
JAMES J. SCAVO, ESQ.*
The resort timeshare industry is experiencing an unprece-
dented degree of growth and prosperity. In 1996, resort timeshare
sales in the United States were over $2.1 billion' with an average
sales price of about $10,000.00 for each timeshare week.2 At that
time, there were over 1.7 million families' in this country that
owned a vacation ownership product.4 Whether oceanfront,
mountain property, or even within an urban setting,5 resort time-
' Partner at Weinstock & Scavo, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia; State University of New
York (B.A. 1973); St. John's University School of Law (J.D. 1976).
1 See AMERICAN RESORT DEV. ASSIN, THE UNITED STATES TIMESHARE INDUSTRY:
OVERVIEW AND ECONOM:IC IMPACT ANALYSIS 1 (1997) [hereinafter TnvIESHARE
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW]; RCI CONSULTING, THE RESORT TIMESHARE INDUSTRY IN THE
UNITED STATES 6 (1997) [hereinafter RCI STUDY].
2 Studios average $7,000 and two-bedrooms $14,000. See Carl Larson, Time
Shares: A New Boom, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 10, 1997, at H4, available in
1997 WL 3147674. "Timeshare is one of the hottest segments of the real estate in-
dustry, growing at an annual compound rate of 17 percent the past 16 years." Corrie
M. Anders, Developers Hoping the Time is Right for Urban Timeshares, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 14, 1996, at 1111, available in 1996 WL 6940590.
3 See TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 37; Lisa Bartleim, Tour-
ism Development's New Wave Has An Old Name: Timeshare, DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 1,
1997, at A5 (stating that in 1996, 1.8 million U.S. residents owned timeshare units).
4 Vacation ownership product includes two basic types of timesharing projects. In
the first type consumers receive a fee interest, coupled with an exclusive but restricted
right of occupancy. In the second type, consumers receive a lease, license or club mem-
bership that allows the person to use the property for a specific amount of time each
year for a stated number of years. See Joseph F. Scalo, Timesharing in the 90's, PROB.
& PROP., 22, 22 (1993) (MThe term 'vacation ownership' rather than the more tradi-
tional 'timesharing' is now the industry vogue to more accurately reflect the changing
nature of the product."); see also Ralph E. Stone, The Federal Trade Commission and
Timeshare Resale Companies, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 49,51 (1990) (same).
r Vacation ownership products have recently been developed in large urban mar-
kets such as New York and Boston. In 1996, the 360-unit Manhattan Club was
launched in New York City, which is the world's largest urban vacation ownership de-
velopment. The Boston Custom House is another large urban vacation ownership de-
velopment which has recently opened. See Anders, supra note 2, at 11H (discussing the
Manhattan Club and Custom House Tower projects, as well as other urban timeshare
projects that are attractive to developers and consumers); Larson, supra note 2, at H4
("Urban time-share growth floundered during the real-estate downturn of the late 80's
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share may be one of the best uses of property in the vacation in-
dustry.
6
Timeshare developers have high profit expectations. For ex-
ample, rather than a single sale of a condominium unit, the sale of
a vacation ownership or timeshare interest means potentially
fifty-two interests sold in each unit.' Timeshare developers seek
to realize a profit margin roughly between 20% and 40% on these
sales. Typically, 30% to 50% of revenues will be devoted to sales
and marketing costs in order to achieve these high profit margins 8
With such profit potential, it was foreseeable that the public
financing market would be attracted to the resort timeshare in-
dustry. In recent years, the timeshare resort industry has seen at
least five companies go from privately held business enterprises to
publicly held and traded companies.9 This transition has helped
the industry in raising money to continue to grow in acquisitions,
sales, and development." Additionally, not only has there been an
increase in the involvement of the public market in the resort
timeshare world, but there has also been a continued involvement
by hotel companies, most of which have a natural affinity with the
concepts of resort timesharing.1 Whether the players are small
but now appears to have picked up steam again, with the opening of the Manhattan
Club and Marriott's current renovation of Boston's old government Custom House, va-
cant since 1987, as that city's first time share."); Bob Temliak, Real Estate Update,
N.Y. L.J., July 17, 1996, at 5 (discussing the Manhattan Club).
6 See Kyle Hughes & John Machacek, State May Ease Time-Share Rules,
DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Rochester, N.Y.), Dec. 1, 1995, at 6B (stating that New York
Attorney General Dennis Vacco planned to change state timeshare regulations to spur
timeshare companies to develop in New York in order to benefit from the "huge
[timeshare] industry"); see also Bartleim, supra note 3, at 1 ("fimeshare-when it
sells-is widely considered the highest use for ownership properties.").
7 See TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 5.
8 See id, at 31.See id.
'0 See id. at 6. Privately held companies which have gone public include: Signature
Resorts, Inc.; Trend West; Vistana; Vacation Break U.S.A., Inc.; and Silverleaf Resorts,
Inc. Additionally, two companies, Bluegreen Resorts, Inc. and Fairfield Communities,
Inc., have already been operating as publicly held companies.
1' Hilton and Marriott are examples of large hotel companies involved in time-
share. "Hotel companies, operating in a hospitality industry that's mature and expand-
ing at only two (2) percent a year, got into time sharing because they needed a new
way to expand market share and revenues." Bartleim, supra note 3, at 1 (citing Jon
Simon, partner for real estate and hospitality consulting at KPMG Peat Marwick in
Miami); see also Debra Wishik Englander, Mickey Mouse Time-shares Worth A Look,
35 MONEY, Dec. 1, 1991, at 35, 36 ("Topnotch hoteliers such as Marriott, Hilton and
Disney are stepping into the field and making time-shares a more credible option.");
Barbara Hetzer, Timeshares: Their Time Has Come, BUS. WK., Apr. 14, 1997, at 108,
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entrepreneurs or major hotel chains and public companies, the in-
dustry is driven by its successful sales and marketing efforts.
I. TIMESHARE PRODUCTS
In the pursuit of sales and marketing success, the timeshare
industry has "invented" a variety of timeshare products and mar-
keting approaches, all for the ultimate goal of selling timeshare in-
terests. There is the basic timeshare week offering generally re-
ferred to as a "fixed week."2 The fixed week, a traditional product
of the resort timeshare offering, is a week of use in a resort facility
reccurring each year at the same time." The fixed week, as well
as the floating week discussed below, may exist as a timeshare es-
tate" or a timeshare use. "5 Before 1995, fixed timeshare weeks ac-
counted for 85% of all timeshare sales. 6
More recently, the industry has rapidly moved towards a
flexible use concept." The flexible use concept is a plan whereby a
108 (noting that Disney, Marriott, Hyatt, and Hilton offer timeshares).
12 JoAnne P. Stubblefield, Interval Ownership and Vacation Club Options, ALI-
ABA 1181, 1186 (1995) ("Historically, timeshare programs have involved 52 one
week use periods beginning on the first Saturday of each calendar year and lasting
seven days, with each successive timeshare week beginning on successive Saturdays
throughout the year."); Scalo, supra note 4, at 22 ("Most early timesharing projects
were structured on a fixed time, fixed unit basis; the consumer vacationed during
the same week and stayed in the same unit at the same project year after year.").
'3 See Stubblefield, supra note 12, at 1186 ("If a purchasers' use rights are based
on fixed time periods, each purchaser is assigned a specific week (e.g. Week No. 32)
at the time of purchase and is entitled to exclusive occupancy of the accommoda-
tions during that particular week every year.").
14 See Carl H. Lisman & Carol A. Cluff, Time Sharing, AI-ABA 381, 384 (1990)
(defining a "time share estate" as "a right to occupy during separate time periods,
coupled with a freehold estate or an estate for years"). The Illinois Real Estate Time-
Share Act, for example, defines "time-share estate" as "any arrangement under which
the purchaser receives a fee ownership interest in real property and the right to use
the accommodations in a time-share project or unit for a specified period of less than
one year on a recurring basis extending over more than three years." 765 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 100/3-15 (West 1993).
15 The Illinois Real Estate Time-Share Act, for example, defines a "[tlime-share
use" as "any arrangement, whether by lease, rental agreement, license, use agreement
or other means, under which the purchaser receives a right to use an accommodation
or unit in a time-share project or unit for a specified period of less than one year on a
recurring basis extending over more than three years, but under which the purchaser
does not receive a fee simple interest in any real property." 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
100/3-21 (West 1993).16 See TImESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 1.
17 See Scalo, supra note 4, at 22. Scalo notes:
A 1990 study conducted by the Gallup Organization for the International
Foundation for TimeSharing demonstrated that negative attitudes toward
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timeshare purchaser acquires, for example, a week interval with
the flexibility of using that week interval either seasonally or at
any time during the year, subject to availability and proper reser-
vation. 8 With the introduction of flexible use plans, the percent-
age of buyers acquiring fixed weeks had dropped to 28%.19 As of
1995, almost 50% of resorts were offering some form of flexible use
plan.2"
Another timeshare product is the split week, which provides
purchasers the opportunity to reserve the acquired vacation inter-
est for a time period less than a whole week.21 On the other hand,
if a purchaser prefers to acquire the full week but does not desire
to use the week every year, many timeshare developers have made
available the product commonly referred to as the biennial time-
share interest. The biennial timeshare interest is defined in the
industry as the use of the acquired timeshare week every other
year.
22
timesharing emanated from a desire not to vacation in the same place at
the same time each year. To address this negative attitude, many develop-
ers structured timesharing projects on a floating or flexible time basis so
the consumer could vacation in the same or a different unit at the same
project during different times each year.
Id.; see also Lisman & Cluff, supra note 14, at 385 ("[Plurchasers seek flexibility to
vary their use and relief from the regularly repeating schedule. Not unsurprisingly,
accommodations have been made; and the variations are endless.").
,8 See Lisman & Cluff, supra note 14, at 385 ("Alternatives to the fixed recur-
ring period of time are based either on a rotational or seasonal schedule.").
See TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 6.
20 For example, The Manhattan Club allows owners to "experience their 'week' in
individual days or groups of days whenever they desire during each 12-month cycle,
and won't be locked into any specific week during their use period." Temliak, supra
note 5, at 5; see also TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 25 (stating that
in 1995, 21% of resorts offered seasonal floating time, 20% offered year round floating
time, and 6% offered points allowing expanded use).
21 See Stubblefield, supra note 12, at 1187 (noting that "by splitting weeks, a de-
veloper can offer interests which entitle the purchaser to use of the accommodations
for only three or four days per year for approximately half the cost of a full week"); RCI
STUDY, supra note 1, at 5 (stating that 38.9% of resort timeshare projects in the United
States which currently have active marketing and sales programs offer a split week).
22 See Stubblefield, supra note 12, at 1187 ("The purchaser of an odd/even year
interest would obtain the right to use the accommodations only during odd years or
only during even years; ... the purchaser would generally have only one-half of a
vote and pay only one-half of the maintenance fee charged to owners of consecutive
year interests."); Scalo, supra note 4, at 22 (recognizing that "[slome projects have
interests structured with use periods occurring every other year. One owner may be
entitled to come during odd years and a second owner is entitled to come during
even years").
Nationally, 12% of resorts offer a biennial timeshare interest. This percentage
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If a purchaser wishes to acquire something more than merely
a timeshare week, the timeshare industry has responded to that
need as well with the fractional timeshare interest. This is de-
fined in the resort industry as the offering of a vacation interval of
more than a single week.' This vacation product is actively being
marketed by developers.
Whatever the product offered, whether a fixed week, floating
week, split week, biennial week, or fractional timeshare interest,
the exchange program has been commonly associated with the of-
fering of a timeshare interest. The exchange program offering al-
lows timeshare owners to take advantage of networking use
throughout the world.24
In addition to the exchange privilege which is arranged
through an independent exchange program, timeshare developers
also offer an internal exchange or network of use.' This concept is
prearranged among resorts that are owned or controlled by single
developers.2 ' This concept was, to a large degree, a foundation for
more recent offerings of club products, all of which open up the use
of the acquired timeshare interest to a network of resorts. 7
Additionally, many developers offer bonus time to timeshare
rises to 36% in the Pacific region, which includes Hawaii, where the high cost of
traveling there coupled with the relatively high cost of timeshare intervals in the
resort area, contributed to this trend. See TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra
note 1, at 23-24.
2 See TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 24. Fractional interests,
available at 8.8% of all resorts, are more common in the Northeast and Mountain re-
gions. See id.; see also Lisman & Cluff, supra note 14, at 385 ("[Slome purchasers de-
sire more than an opportunity to use during only a single season. One solution is to
provide for fewer users who obtain occupancy rights to more than one period in a year,
such as one week in each calendar quarter (thereby limiting the regime to 13 owners
or users) or seasons (perhaps limiting the regime to fewer than 13.)"). Purchasers are
more willing to commit to longer periods when climatic changes will not affect use. See
Scalo, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that some projects offer fractional interest fees struc-
tured as quartershares, ffthshares, tenthshares and other fractional bases).
24 See TIMSHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 54 (stating that exchange
programs are the most important motivation for purchasing timeshares and reporting
that approximately 42% of U.S. timeshare owners' time is exchanged); see also
RICHARD L. RAGATz ASsoCS., TIMESHARE PURCHASERS: WHO THEY ARE, WHY THEY
BUY 81 (1982) (noting that "[tihe overwhelming majority of [timeshare owners] bought
their timeshares at least in part due to the exchange privilege"); Scalo, supra note 4, at
23 (noting that belonging to a separate exchange program allows the purchaser to va-
cation at a different resort each year and potentially "vacation almost anywhere").
2 See TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 27.
26 See i&d (finding that 27.3% of all active projects are part of networks and the av-
erage network or club incorporates 17.6 different resorts).
27 See id.
1999]
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purchasers when it is available. This allows purchasers to extend
their timeshare use beyond their original purchase.'
II. TIMESHARE MARKETING
Whatever the timeshare product or enhancement introduced
into the resort timeshare sale, the marketing of such products in
the resort timeshare world has increasingly become an art and
science unto itself. Marketing by way of promotional contests,
popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s has, in many respects,
given way to owner referral programs, in-house guest programs,
off-premise contact solicitation, direct mail and telephone solicita-
tion, and the concept of an entry level introductory product.
Each of the above is aimed at producing prospects for sales of
the timeshare products themselves. It is these prospects that
eventually become new timeshare owners. For example, the
owner referral program seeks new prospects by obtaining the
names of potentially interested persons from existing owners, or
otherwise upgrading existing owners into a new resort timeshare
product offering, usually from the same developer. 9 The owner re-
ferral program often works in conjunction with the in-house guest
program."0 This program identifies prospects from owners and
then invites those prospects to be guests of the resort with the goal
being that the satisfied guest will become a timeshare buyer. 1 On
the other hand, the off-premise contact solicitation does not rely
on existing owners, but rather seeks to attract those vacationing
in the area of the timeshare facility to a timeshare presentation.32
28 See RCI STUDY, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that 66.9% of developers offer bonus
time).
29 See RCI STUDY, supra note 1, at 52; see also Shari Caudron, Right on Target,
245 INDUSTRY WK. 16 (1996). For example, Disney has a program called Sharing the
Magic, whereby it sends recent timeshare purchasers a direct mail package explain-
ing the referral process. A telemarketing specialist then calls the purchaser to fol-
low up and to answer questions. A newsletter is also sent to timeshare members to
encourage the referral process. When someone is successfully referred, the referring
customer is rewarded with free stays and other gifts. See id.
32 See RCI STUDY, supra note 1, at 52 (stating that "[t]hree marketing programs
are used by more than two-thirds of the active projects, including referrals (87.4
percent), in-house guests (renters or exchangers) (79.2 percent) and telemarketing
(69.5 percent)"); Caudron, supra note 29, at 16 (discussing the process of referrals).
31 See Caudron, supra note 29, at 16 (discussing the use of a referral system
whereby owners of timeshares refer new prospects, who are than invited to be
guests of the resort).
3 Many sellers offer prizes to consumers who listen to a sales presentation. See
Joel Sleed, FTC Has Tips for Timeshare Shoppers, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb.
222 [73:217
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The unbounded contact made through off-premise solicitations,
however, has the potential of producing unqualified prospects
Therefore, direct mailing, in connection with telephone solicita-
tion, which rely upon demographically selected individuals, is de-
veloping as more favored marketing approach.33 The entry level
introductory product has recently made inroads into marketing
plans. It offers the consumer a sample of what the timeshare ex-
perience might be by providing a singular use stay at a timeshare
facility, which is occasionally coupled with the exchange experi-
ence.3
Whatever the marketing plan, credible studies indicate that
timeshare purchasers, ultimately, despite the checkered past of
the timeshare industry, view the buying process as positive.'
Furthermore, a significant percentage are happy with their ac-
quisition.
III. THE RULES OF THE MARKETING GAME
With all the upside potential, both to the timeshare developer
23, 1984, at C2, available in 1984 WL 2269750 (discussing the most common prizes,
which include gold and jewels or free vacations); see also Carlo Wolff, Making Sun-
terra a Household Word, 54 LODGING HOSPITALITY 61 (1998) (explaining the strat-
egy of off-premise contact); Tom Kelly, Details to Consider Before Investing in a
Timeshare, SEATTLE TIMES, June 4, 1995, at G1, available in 1995 WL 5026008
(recognizing that one in five people who attend timeshare presentations buy a time-
share).
"See RCI STUDY, supra note 1, at 52 (finding that "an increasingly larger pro-
portion of active projects are using telemarketing [and] direct mail"); Adam Woods,
Timeshare Company in Bid to Retain Members, PRECISION MARKETING, Aug. 31,
1998, at 6, available in 1998 WL 8681352 (stating that RCI, a timeshare exchange
company, engaged in direct mail solicitation to encourage membership renewal).
In general, exchanges enable a timeshare owner to utilize a timeshare in a
different area. See Paul Barron, The Louisiana Timeshare Act: An Analysis and As-
sessment, 58 TUL. L. REV. 863, 868 (1984). Timeshare exchanges are a significant
marketing strategy for the developer. See id. at 905; see also Jeremy Seal, The Holi-
day Swap Shop, TIMEES (London), Mar. 16, 1996, at 2 (noting that owners can ex-
change timeshares all over the world); supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text
(discussing exchange programs).
I' A majority of timeshare owners report the process of buying a timeshare as neu-
tral or positive. See TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 46 (stating that
73.8% of timeshare owners would characterize the buying process as either "very posi-
tive" or "somewhat positive").
" See TAIESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 1, at 3 (indicating that "[mlore
than three-quarters of timeshare owners say their lives have been very positively af-
fected by the purchase of their vacation interest"). It is also interesting to note that the
average cancellation rate is very low. See RCI STUDY, supra note 1, at 50 (finding that
the average cancellation rate is 15%).
1999]
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in terms of profit and to the consumer in terms of satisfaction with
their acquisition, resort timeshare developers should be mindful of
the rules of the marketing game. They need to engage in smart
marketing which means being prepared, planning ahead, and
knowing the rules. Successful sales closing percentages, based
upon a faulty marketing plan are, quite obviously, a developer's
house of cards. Failure to understand and follow the legal rules
applicable to a particular marketing technique may only create
the mirage of a successful sales program.
In today's world, the rules applicable to a respective market-
ing plan are not always easily identified. Many resort timeshare
marketing plans are nationwide, if not worldwide, in scope, thus
multiplying the jurisdictional levels of regulations.38 A resort
timeshare facility located in one state may seek prospects and ad-
vertise in another state, and either close the sale in their home
state, or entice residents of the second state into the situs state
where the timeshare facility is located.39 The various marketing
concepts identified above each have their own separate legal rules
and because of the nationwide marketing potential, the rules dif-
fer depending upon the number of jurisdictions in which the mar-
keting plan has contact.0
With a simple marketing concept such as off-premise contact,
where solicitors offer a gift if one accepts the tour invitation, legal
rules which stem from the jurisdiction in which the off-premise
solicitor is located generally govern. For example, when an off-
37 Failure to comply with statutory requirements may also expose the developer
to liability. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131.12(A)(1) (West 1991) (requiring that all
marketing with respect to timeshares be substantiated, truthful, and not mislead-
ing); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 221.031 (West 1995) (mandating that a developer dis-
close the purpose of timeshare solicitation before utilizing any marketing strate-
gies).
38 Many resorts across the United States have marketing and sales programs.
See RCI STUDY, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that "[uit is estimated that 294 resort
timeshare projects in the United States currently have active marketing and sales
programs") (emphasis omitted); see also TIMESHARE INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra
note 1, at 53 (stating that "11.9% of all [American] timeshare owners express some
degree of interest in purchasing vacation ownership in a resort outside of the
[United States]").
"9 See Stubblefield, supra note 12, at 1193 (observing that in a majority of cases,
timeshare developers rely heavily on consumers from other states to purchase time-
share interests).
40 A Louisiana statute requires the developer to file advertising material for a
timeshare plan prior to use. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131.12(B) (West 1991). In
Florida, the statute is more explicit and requires the developer to file advertising
material ten days prior to use. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.11(1)(a) (West 1988).
[73:217
MARKETING RESORT TIMESHARES
premise solicitor contacts an individual on a beach in Florida and
offers a gift in exchange for a tour of a timeshare facility, the li-
censing laws of the State of Florida will be applicable to the off-
premise contact solicitor.4 The local jurisdiction may also regulate
where an off-premise contact solicitor may actually engage in so-
licitation activities." Still another area of regulation concerning
off-premise solicitation, and one which permeates any marketing
plan, is the issue of discrimination. In at least one situation, the
Justice Department has investigated whether an off-premise so-
licitation marketing plan discriminated against Hasidic Jews.43
Like off-premise contact solicitation," referral marketing has
several applicable rules, many of which are easily identified.45 An
obvious question is whether the source referring a potential pur-
chaser needs to obtain any particular license. In some jurisdic-
tions, if the source making the referral is compensated and if the
transaction is determined to involve real estate, then the party re-
ferring the prospect may need to have a real estate license.46 In
some circumstances, if a person, acting as a referral agent, is not
involved in actual negotiations or execution of documents and was
involved only in the referral of one person to another, as long as
41 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.20(2)(a) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring "each off-
premises solicitor or other person who engages in the solicitation of prospective pur-
chasers of units in a time-share plan [to] purchase a ... time-share occupational li-
cense").
42 For example, one ordinance makes it illegal to make an off-premise contact in
the French Quarter in New Orleans for the purpose of soliciting a timeshare. See
Timeshare Request Rejected, BATON ROUGE SUNDAY ADVOC., Sept. 29, 1985, at 4B,
available in 1985 WL 4109943 (discussing the city ordinance which prohibits the dis-
tribution of timeshare advertising in the French Quarter).
43 See Maya Bell, 'Bandit' Airs Time-Shares'Dirty Laundry, ORLANDO SENTINEL
TRIB., June 2, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Orsent File (discussing the
investigation by the Justice Department, and noting that a timeshare seller admit-
ted discriminating against potential buyers in the past).
"See Wolff, supra note 32, at 61 (discussing the process of off-premise contact
solicitation).
45 For statutes discussing provisions with respect to referring parties, see ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-14-202 (Michie Supp. 1997), GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-186 (Supp.
1998), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.19 (West Supp. 1999), TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
6573a (West Supp. 1999).
46 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.19 (West Supp. 1999) (explaining that a refer-
ring party shall not accept compensation from a real estate broker if the amount paid
exceeds $150); TEX. REV. CV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a (stating that it is unlawful for a
person to act as a real estate broker without a license and defining a real estate broker
as including someone who, for consideration, assists in the procurement of prospects);
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-190 (Supp. 1998) (stating that it is unlawful to act as a
sales agent without a license).
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there is no fee charged and the number of transactions involved is
limited, an exception from real estate licensing requirements may
apply.4 7 The mere limiting of the number of referrals per year may
be sufficient for an off-premises contact solicitor to avoid real es-
tate licensing.48
The entry level program has also raised some recent legal is-
sues. Generally, in the entry level circumstance, a developer seeks
to introduce a prospect to the resort timeshare concept by allowing
a sampling of use, without the purchase of a timeshare interest.
In concept, advertising for the entry level program is very similar
to advertising related to the timeshare plan itself. More recently,
however, in what has little foundation in statutory construction,
several jurisdictions have examined whether the entry level prod-
uct, itself, constitutes a timeshare offering.49 If this short term en-
try product is viewed as the timeshare product itself, the entire
panoply of timeshare regulation would apply then to the offering
of what truly is no more than an attempt to encourage the con-
sumer to acquire a timeshare interest. This full array of time-
share protection would include, for example, registration require-
ments applicable to the short term product," escrow arrangements
being employed for receipt of money for purchase of the short term
product,51 delivery of an approved public offering statement,52 and
47 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-40-29(a)(9) (Supp. 1998) (listing the requirements
for such an exemption).
4 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.20(2)(e) (West 1988) (exempting from the re-
quirement of a real estate license any "purchaser who refers no more than 20 people to
a developer per year or who otherwise provides testimonials on behalf of a developer").
49 See Second Workshop on Short-Term Products, FLORIDAADMIN. WKLY (1997).
For examples of typical timeshare registration requirements, see ARK. CODE
ANN. § 18-14-204(a) (Michie 1987); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/17 (West 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.36.020 (West 1994); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13,
§ 24.1 (1995).
6' For examples of a statutory requirement of the establishmaent of an escrow ac-
count, see ALA. CODE § 34-27-55 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.08(1) (West Supp. 1999)
(stating that a developer must establish an escrow account prior to filing a public offer-
ing statement); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/15 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring de-
posit in connection with timeshare to be deposited in escrow); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §
221.061 (West 1995) (requiring a developer to establish an escrow account in connec-
tion with proposed sales of timeshare interests).
r2 For examples of the information required to be contained in a public offering
statement, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1864 (1996 & Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§721.07 (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-172 (Supp. 1998); 765 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 100/12 (West Supp. 1998); TEYx PROP. CODE ANN. § 221.032 (West 1995)
(requiring information such as a description of the accommodations and the timeshare
interests currently available).
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the applicability of statutory rescission periods to the entry level
product acquired.53 Viewing the entry level product as encour-
agement to be introduced to timeshare and thus advertisement,
does not dispense with the foregoing requirements. It merely
applies the foregoing protections to the ultimate acquisition of the
timeshare interest itself, rather than the entry level product of-
fered.
IV. DIRECT MAIL
Since the 1980s, the timeshare world has relied heavily upon
direct mail solicitation. Much of the direct mail solicitation has
traditionally been founded upon promotional contests and gift
giveaways. Promotional contest and gift giveaway statutes exist
in many states.' For the most part, these statutes regulate many
aspects of the promotional contest or gift giveaway. For example,
it is not unusual for such a statute to require, within the direct
mail promotion, disclosure of the odds and verifiable retail price of
receiving a particular item.5 Obviously, in the case of a gift
giveaway, odds would not be disclosed, since it is purely a gift. It
is only in the promotional contest type of solicitation where there
are odds of receiving one item or another, that the odds are re-
quired to be disclosed. In either case, however, whether it is a
sweepstakes type offering or a gift giveaway offering, the verifi-
' For examples of statutory rescission periods of timeshare purchases, see ALA.
CODE § 34-27-53 (1997) (giving purchaser a five day right to cancellation); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 721.10(1) (West 1988) (giving purchaser right to cancel contract ten days after
the date of sale or date on which purchaser received last of all documents); 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/16 (West 1993) (giving purchaser right to cancel three days af-
ter receipt of public offering statement or execution of contract); TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 221.041 (West 1995) (stating that the purchaser has the right to cancel until 6
days after the contract is signed).
"See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.111 (West Supp. 1999) (regulating the use of ad-
vertising materials involving gifts and prizes); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393 (Supp. 1998)
(prohibiting deceptive practices in consumer transactions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:1131.12(E) (West 1991) (controlling advertising techniques, including those utilizing
prizes or gifts); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 37-53-401 to -403 (1997) (regulating prize and gift
promotional offers for timeshares).
' See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131.12(G)(5)(d) (West 1991) (requiring the
odds of receiving a particular prize to be disclosed if the number of items to be
awarded is limited); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 11A-119(d) (1996) (requiring dis-
closure of the retail value or merchandise or services offered as a prize); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 407.610(1)(5) (West 1990) (requiring disclosure of the suggested retail value
of items promoted); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 221.031 (West 1998) (requiring promo-
tional advertisements to include the odds of winning and a statement of the retail
value of the gift or prize).
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able retail price is usually required to be disclosed.56
In addition, many promotional contests or gift giveaway stat-
utes require disclosure of the verifiable retail price of the premi-
ums or gifts to be distributed. 5 Many of the applicable statutes
dictate how that price is to be determined.58 Other aspects regu-
lated by gift giveaway and promotional contest statutes include,
for example, disclosure of the identity of the sponsor and devel-
oper, 9 disclosure of the geographical area in which the gift givea-
way or promotional contest is being arranged," a prohibition of
substitution of gifts, and regulations requiring the distribution of a
gift or the identification of the sweepstakes prize immediately
upon the participant traveling to a place of business.
61
In addition to resort timeshares, promotional contests and gift
giveaways have also been used by many businesses.62 Many state
6 See id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-61.1-3 (1993) (requiring the "actual retail
value" to me no more than the promoters "good faith estimate of the appraised retail
value"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-15-40 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring that the retail
price be disclosed when a consumer has a chance to receive or win an item of value);
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-417.1 (Michie 1998) (requiring disclosure of the "actual retail
price" of any "item or prize" offered in a solicitation for "sale or lease of goods, prop-
erty or service").
57 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-27-60 (1997) (declaring it a violation for a gift to be
used in a promotion without full disclosure of the fair market value); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 18-14-504 (Michie 1987) (making it unlawful to offer a gift without disclosing
the retail price of the gift); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.508(4) (West 1997) (stating that
the offeror must keep records for one year containing the information used to de-
termine the retail price of the prize); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.610(1)(5) (West 1990)
(requiring the promotional materials contain the "suggested retail price" of the
prize).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-295(9) (West Supp. 1998) (stating that verifi-
able retail value is determined by value of item if sold or a similar item's market value,
or no more than three times the cost to the sponsor); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(b)(16)
(declaring that verifiable retail value is the price at which a substantial number were
sold at retail, or no more than three times the cost to the sponsor); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
100.171 (West Supp. 1998) (stating that verifiable retail value is determined by the
price if a substantial number were sold, or by no more than 1.5 times the cost to the
sponsor); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-201(a)(vi) (Michie 1997) (requiring the value to be
either the price at which "a substantial number of the prizes have been sold by a per-
son other than the solicitor" or "no more than one and five-tenths (1.5) times the
amount the solicitor ... paid for the prize").
59 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(b)(16)(B) (requiring notice containing the
name and address of the sponsor); MINN. STAT. § 325F.755 (West 1995) (requiring
disclosure of location of sponsor's principal place of business).
60 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.111(5)(b) (West 1988) (requiring address from
where gift was obtained).
61 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-297 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring dis-
closure of all restrictions).
62 For examples of promotional contests used by Time magazine, see Haskell v.
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statutes, however, require the disclosure of any conditions to the
giving of the gift or identification of the prize, such as the common
requirement that one take a tour of a timeshare as a prerequisite
to receiving the gift.' In many of the applicable statutes, the dis-
closure that the participant will be required or invited to attend a
sales presentation is required to be disclosed in the solicitation in
10-point bold and conspicuous wording.'
In addition to specific state statutory provisions related to di-
rect mail, such as gift giveaways or promotional contests, general
principles of deceptive trade practices under federal and state
trade practice laws would also be applicable.65 The analysis with
regard to any direct mail piece, whether it is a promotional con-
test, gift giveaway or otherwise, is founded upon the question of
whether the direct mail piece contributes false, misleading, or de-
ceptive advertising. The analysis involves whether "'members of
the public are likely to be deceived.' ,,66 While there is some debate
as to how one is to evaluate whether a member of the public is
likely to be deceived, it is generally construed on a federal basis
that the evaluation of this claim must be from the vantage point of
the "reasonable consumer." 7 This concept of the "reasonable con-
Time, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that sweepstakes have
been a common part of Time's advertising campaigns), and Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68
F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that Time's "Million Dollar Dream Sweepstakes"
were sent to millions of people).
' See GA. CODE ANN. §10-1-393(b)(16) (prohibiting any misleading information
about any prize); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 369-ee (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 1999)
(requiring disclosure of all terms and conditions attached to a prize); TE. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 221.031 (West 1995) (requiring disclosure of complete rules of contest and
claiming prizes).
' See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393(b)(16) (requiring conspicuous notice which is de-
fined as "either a larger or bolder type than the adjacent and surrounding material");
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514E-11(3) (Michie Supp. 1998) (requiring written disclosure
in at least ten-point bold type if attending a sales presentation is a prerequisite to re-
ceiving the gift); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369-ee (1)(c) (McKinney 1996) (requiring con-
spicuous written disclosure of sales presentation attendance requirement); cf. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:1721(A)(1) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring "written disclosure" to make
a written offer of a prize, if, in order to receive the prize, consumers are "given, invited,
required or requested to submit to a sales presentation").
See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979)
(holding that direct mail procedures were forms of deceptive trade practices); Com-
monwealth v. Telcom Directories, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1991) (holding that
state law against deceptive trade practices applies to direct mail).
f Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992) (in banc)
(quoting Chern v. Bank of America, 554 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Cal. 1976) (in banc)).
67Haskell, 857 F. Supp. at 1399 (concluding that since millions of residents receive
the sweepstakes a reasonable person standard is appropriate); see also Freeman, 68
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sumer" is consistent with federal court and Federal Trade Com-
mission interpretations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. 68 The Federal Trade Commission Act governs false
advertising and deceptive trade practices.69 Many state statutes
governing unfair business practices are modeled upon the Federal
Trade Commission Act, and can be referred to as "mini federal
trade commission acts."70 In particular, the Federal Trade Com-
mission's 1983 Policy Statement expressly provides that its policy
was to "examine the practice from the perspective of a consumer
acting reasonably in the circumstances."71 This policy statement
added "[t]he Commission believes that to be deceptive, the repre-
sentation, omission or practice must be likely to mislead reason-
able consumers under the circumstances. The test is whether the
consumer's interpretation or reaction is reasonable."72
While, quite clearly, there are some cases that, based on their
facts, apply a standard less than that of the reasonable person,
that is, the subjective standard, these cases generally are appli-
cable to circumstances where the defined group affected by the
advertisement is an infirm class.73 These cases should be distin-
F.3d at 289 (rejecting plaintiffs contention that an unwary customer standard should
apply, and choosing instead a person of ordinary intelligence standard).15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994); see also FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095
(9th Cir. 1994) (stating that reasonableness is an element of the three part test used by
the Commission); FTC v. US Sales Corp., 785 F. Supp. 737, 747-48 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(holding that the FTC need only show that a reasonable customer would be likely to be
misled).
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1994) (describing what constitutes false advertising which
is considered a deceptive trade practice).
70 Cf Brennan v. Carvel Corp., 929 F.2d 801, 811 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying Massa-
chusetts' "Little FTC" Act in unfair trade practice suit); Nieman v. Dryclean U.SA
Franchise Co., No. 95-1390-CIV-FERGUSON, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22008, at *1-*2
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 1997) (interpreting Florida's "Little FTC Act" as intending "to pro-
tect individuals and consumers from unfair methods of competition, and unfair, de-
ceptive, and unconscionable practices in the conduct of trade or commerce"); Boos v.
Abbott Laboratories, 925 F. Supp. 49, 55 (D. Mass. 1996) (describing Chapter 93A of
the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act as a "mini-FTC" act as prohibiting unfair
or deceptive practices); Haskell, 857 F. Supp. at 1399 ("ITlhe [California] Unfair Busi-
ness Practices Act is one of the so-called 'little FTC Acts'... [and] judicial interpreta-
tions of the federal act have persuasive force.").
71 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,205, at 20,913 (1998).72ida
"See, e.g., United States v. Goodman, 984 F.2d 235, 239 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating
that some gullible customers may need more protection); Haskell, 857 F. Supp. at 1399
(using the reasonable person standard in evaluating the Federal Trade Commission
Act and stating that "unless particularly gullible consumers are targeted, a reasonable
person may expect others to behave reasonably as well").
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guished from those where the promotional advertising is distrib-
uted on a mass basis, thus not focused upon any one particular
"infirm group" but rather the public at large.74 In furtherance of
this, Federal Trade Commission decisions have recognized that
while some people, because of ignorance or incomprehension, may
be misled by even a scrupulously honest claim, the representation
made in the advertisement "does not become 'false and deceptive'
merely because it [would] be unreasonably misunderstood by an
insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the class of persons
to whom the representation is addressed."75
Consistent with the analysis that direct mail, as any adver-
tisement, should be viewed from the perspective of the reasonable
person, it would appear that most courts would take into account
that the average American has become familiar with direct mail
advertising.76 In today's society, it would not appear disputable
that the "reasonable person standard" has become inured to (and
perhaps inundated with) the receipt of direct mail solicitations.
Direct mail has become a major industry and the average con-
sumer receives hundreds of direct mail pieces each year.77 Per-
haps it is the case that most direct mail is trashed by the recipi-
ent. However, if the advertiser has done its job well, recipients of
the direct mail piece will be attracted to it, thereby catching their
interest. An advertiser, including a timeshare developer, who at-
tracts a consumer to a solicitation through direct mail, whether it
is by use of attractive colors and pictures or carefully thought out
words, should establish some degree of legal protection by assur-
ing that the reasonable person would not be misled by the solici-
4 See, e.g., Sharpe v. American Family Publishers, No. 91-181-CIV-5-BO, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6292, at *12 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 26, 1993) (requiring a reasonable per-
son test for mass mailings), affd, No. 93-1580, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 12454 (4th
Cir. May 27, 1994) (unpublished table disposition); State v. Imperial Marketing, 506
S.E.2d 799, 804 n.8 (W. Va. 1998) (per curiam) (acknowledging state law requiring
the use of the reasonable person standard for mass mailings).
7r In re Kirchner, 63 FTC 1282, 1290 (1963) (holding that reliance on one's own
subjective impressions places fault on the consumer, not the advertiser); see also Lamb
v. United States Sales Corp., 390 S.E.2d 440,441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (declining to find
the existence of deceptive advertising) (citing Blum v. GMAC, 365 S.E.2d 474,476 (Ga.
Ct. A pp. 1988)).
7 See Goodman, 984 F.2d at 239 (noting that U.S. mail is constantly flooded
with direct mail sweepstakes and advertising).
77 See FTC v. Wilcox, 926 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (characterizing a
50 million person solicitation as "massive"); State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 501 P.2d
290, 294 (Wash. 1972) (noting that Reader's Digest sends between 2.5 and 3 million
sweepstakes advertisements annually).
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tation.
In the legal analysis of direct mail solicitations, not only is the
reasonable person test to be employed but, advertisers, including
timeshare developers, should not be put to the task of having to
defend each and every word employed in the advertisement.
Quite to the contrary, common sense tells the reasonable person to
read the entire mail piece that they might receive and not to rely
on a particular word out of context. In reading any such direct
mail solicitation, a reasonable person should be presumed to pos-
sess a modicum of life experience and common sense." In further-
ance of this conclusion, it is well established that "piecemeal"
analysis of advertisements in improper. As the Third Circuit
stated in Beneficial Corp. v. FTC," "the tendency of the advertis-
ing to deceive must be judged by viewing it as a whole, without
emphasizing isolated words or phrases apart from their context."'
The FTC itself has stated that it needs to "evaluate the entire ad-
vertisement.., in determining how reasonable consumers are
likely to respond. Thus, in advertising, the Commission will ex-
amine 'the entire mosaic, rather than each tile separately.' ""'
As the foregoing relates to direct mail sweepstakes promo-
tions, again, it would appear that courts are persuaded that the
entire solicitation, and not piecemeal individual words, should be
reviewed. For example, in In re D.L. Blair Corp.,82 the FTC rec-
ognized that while perhaps some persons might merely glance at
an advertisement and decide not to participate, if the agency was
to concern itself with meaningful deceptive advertising cases, it
78 See Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 906 (2d Cir. 1993)
(noting that in making determinations about the messages of advertisers, a fact-finder
must look at the advertisement and apply common sense); see also Peel v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Cormn'n., 496 U.S. 91, 103 (1990) (asserting that "[wie are
satisfied that the consuming public understands that licenses-to drive cars, to oper-
ate radio stations, to sell liquor-are issued by governmental authorities and that a
host of certificates-to commend job performance, to convey an educational degree, to
commemorate a solo flight or a hole in one-are issued by private organizations");
Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. at 1290 ("Perhaps a few misguided souls believe, for example, that
all 'Danish pastry' is made in Denmark Is it, therefore, an actionable deception to ad-
vertise 'Danish pastry' when it is made in this country? Of course not.").
79 542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 617 (supporting the FTC's conclusion that an advertisement was mislead-
ing when read in its entirety).
"' Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,205, at 20,914 (1998) (quoting FTC v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963)).
"82 F.T.C. 234 (1973).
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should not be concerned with that type of contingency.' On the
other hand, the agency found that "[ulnless a person chose to par-
ticipate in a sweepstakes he could not have been deceived to his
detriment."8 With that said, the agency decided to put itself in
the position of a person "who decided to participate in the contest"
and it failed to see how such an individual could avoid reading the
remaining part of the front side of the advertisement because he
or she would have to read that passage to learn how to participate
in the contest." Once again, the solicitation was analyzed in its
entirety.
Courts, in an analysis of deceptive and misleading advertising
principles, have gone on to confirm not only that the whole adver-
tisement must be examined, but that the entire transaction should
be analyzed." In S.Q.KF.C., Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Tricon Leasing
Corp., 7 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a bank, repre-
sented to S.Q.K.F.C. that it would receive a loan without requiring
any personal guarantees.' This "no personal guarantee" repre-
sentation was made both orally and in written proposals to the
plaintiff. The written proposals contained conditions, however,
which implied that personal guarantees may be required. 9 The
court stated that with respect to this factual scenario, a claim un-
der the New York Deceptive Trade Practice law9" could rest on
"[defendant's] initial representation that no individual guaranties
would be required."9 However, the court further noted that a rep-
resentative of the defendant "followed-up his initial statement
that no guaranties would be required with written correspondence
making it very clear that several conditions had to be met before
[the defendant] could commit to any loan terms, including the po-
tential needs for guaranties."2 This court, therefore, concluded
that "[in the presence of these clear disclaimers, a reasonable
"See id. at 256.
"Id.
See, e.g., Cleveland Home Improvement Council v. City of Bedford Heights,
682 N.E.2d 667, 669 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (stating that in a constitutional analysis of
commercial speech, the court must not only determine that the advertising is not
misleading, but must also determine that the transaction was not unlawful).
884 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 1996).
8See id. at 632.
See id.N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 1988).
"Id at 637.
2Id
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consumer would not have been misled by [defendant's] oral repre-
sentation."93 The solicitation was viewed as a whole.
Additionally, any direct mail solicitation must be compared
with the concept of mere "puffery" or "puffing". Puffing is not ac-
tionable under deceptive advertising laws.' The general rule is
that "puffing immunizes an advertisement from liability. 95
Whether an advertisement constitutes puffing can be determined
by the court as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss.96 " Puffery'
is a general claim of superiority or exaggeration which is
'expressed in broad, vague or commendatory language.... [and] is
distinguishable from misdescription or false representations of
specific characteristics of a product."97 Puffery is not actionable as
3Id
" See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1131.12 (West 1991) (making no reference
to vague, laudatory language when stating that timeshare advertisements must not
contain false, misleading, or unsubstantiated statements, or predict specific in-
creases in price); OR. REV. STAT. § 94.945 (1997) (referring only to false and mislead-
ing statements, and not mentioning puffing); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 221.071 (West
1995) (failing to mention generalized or exaggerated statements when determining
that a solicitor acts in a false or misleading way by failure to disclose or disclosure of
a false fact); see also Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection
Serv., Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that "detailed or specific fac-
tual assertions are necessary" for a claim under false advertising laws); Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 741 F.2d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing puffery to be
"claims [which] are either vague or highly subjective. . ."); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Syl-
vania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302, 308 (N.D. IM. 1965) (holding that
"advertising which merely states in general terms that one product is superior is not
actionable").
"s Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc., 911 F.2d at 245; see also Stiffel Co. v. Westwood
Lighting Group, 658 F. Supp. 1103, 1115 (D.N.J. 1987) (asserting that "[glenerally, ad-
vertising the advantages of a product, including claims of general superiority, consti-
tutes puffing and is not actionable"); Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 241, 253 n.
23 (D. Del. 1980) (asserting that a statement which is nothing more than puffing will
not confer liability); Smith-Victor Corp., 242 F. Supp. at 308-09 (cautioning that al-
though statements which merely claim superiority are not actionable, "statements
which ascribe absolute qualities to the defendant's product... could give rise to a legal
liability if they were not true").
6See Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc., 911 F.2d at 245 (approving of the determina-
tion of whether a statement is puffery at the time district courts decide motions to
dismiss); accord In re All Terrain Vehicle Litig., 771 F. Supp. 1057, 1060-61 (C.D. Cal.
1991); For cases where courts determined if a statement constituted puffery while de-
ciding a motion see, for example, Cohen v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 713 F. Supp.
653, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), Metzner v. D.H. Blair & Co., 689 F. Supp. 262, 263-64
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), and Testing Sys., Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286, 288-89
(E.D. Pa. 1966).
97 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Re/Max South County, 882 F. Supp. 915, 926
(C.D. Cal. 1994) (quoting Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 945 (3d Cir.
1993)); see also LensCrafters Inc. v. Vision World Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1481, 1489 (D.
Minn. 1996) (discussing the distinction courts draw between statements of "specific or
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false advertising because reasonable consumers know not to rely
on generalized or even exaggerated statements as factual repre-
sentations.98 As stated previously, the successful marketing of
timeshare interests, particularly through direct mail solicitation,
is aimed at catching a consumer's eye and interest. In this sense,
puffery is recognized as being non-actionable, because courts rec-
ognize that a function of advertising is to attract consumers.99
V. TELEPHONE SOLICITATIONS
Recently, in the world of resort timeshare marketing, direct
mail solicitations have dovetailed with telephone solicitations. In
large part, this practice can be compared with the innovative use
of a direct mail solicitation offering a mini-vacation or vacation
package which may only be purchased through a return telephone
call. Once the recipient of the direct mail solicitation makes the
phone call, purchases the vacation and travels to the destination
or location which is the object of the vacation, the off-premise con-
tact solicitation, previously referred to, becomes involved.'00 In
this case, the off-premise contact solicitation is more controlled
absolute characteristics of a product... and generalized statements of product superi-
ority"); Stiffel Co., 658 F. Supp. at 1115 (finding statements not merely puffery where
the information was claimed to come from testing, and did not merely state advantage
or superiority).
See Alicke v. MCI Communications Corp., 111 F.3d 909, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(finding statements not actionable, as it was unlikely that a reasonable person would
rely on the statement); Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc., 911 F.2d at 246 (agreeing with
the lower courts view that puffig is not actionable because it is not "reason[able] to
assert... that a reasonable consumer would interpret this as a factual claim upon
which he or she could rely"); Marcus v. AT & T Corp., 938 F. Supp. 1158, 1174
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing claims because a reasonable person would not rely only on
the statement made); Haskell, 857 F. Supp. at 1399 (stating that "[aidvertising that
amounts to mere' puffery is not actionable because no reasonable consumer relies on
puffery").
9 See United States v. An Article... Consisting of 216 Individually Cartoned
Bottles, 409 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir. 1969) (discussing how some statements, over time,
are "so associated with the familiar exaggerations of [the particular industry] that vir-
tually everyone can be presumed to be capable of discounting them as puffery");
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568, 580 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (realizing that the "consuming public is conditioned to view such generalized
comparisons with healthy skepticism"); Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. Towne Cadillac
Corp., 592 F. Supp. 801, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (declaring that it is "expected" for sellers
"to extoll or even exaggerate the virtues of their product, or the advantages of buying
from them"); State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 709, 712
(Wis. 1988) (stating that puffing has been considered an acceptable advertising tactic).
'00 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing off-premise contact solici-
tation).
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and planned than mere solicitation in its widespread form of con-
tact with whomever happens to be available. The off-premise con-
tact solicitation provides the solicitor with a specified arrival date
and time. As a result, the solicitor has an identified prospect who
has proven to be interested in vacationing in the particular vaca-
tion area. Timeshare developers in that vacation area are inter-
ested in these identified prospects. Ultimately, the effect of direct
mail and telephone solicitations is to bring together sellers with
prospective purchasers.
The above circumstance certainly involves all the concepts of
deceptive trade practice laws previously discussed, relating to
promotional contests or gift giveaways.' While the sale of the
mini-vacation or vacation package does not constitute a gift
giveaway, the solicitation must still comply with deceptive trade
practice rules.
Timeshare developers and, independently, the industry trade
group, the American Resort Development Association ("ARDA"),' °
examined the practice of mailing solicitations to consumers re-
garding the purchase of possible vacation packages, which would
ultimately be acquired by a consumer only by means of a return
telephone call. When the vacation was taken, the consumer was
either required or invited to attend a timeshare presentation.
Agreements among timeshare developers and state regulators,
and policies independently adopted by ARDA, summarize the
rules of the vacation package offer for solicitation of timeshare in-
terests. Timeshare developers, without any admission of prior
wrongdoing, voluntarily agreed that in the sale of a vacation pack-
age, they would not misrepresent certain facts,0" either directly or
101 See, e.g., supra Part IV for a general discussion of promotional contests and
gift gveaways.
ouSee AMERICAN RESORT DEV. ASSN., Code of Standards & Ethics, in ARDA
MEMBERSHIP DIRECTORY 68 (1997/98) [hereinafter ARDA Code] (setting forth vacation
package interpreting guidelines and proper disclosures to customers regarding cancel-
lation rights and timeshare tours accompanying vacation packages).
'0' One fact that may not be misrepresented is the price of the vacation.
"Unbundling" of any part of the cost of the vacation package as a port fee, charge or
tax (unless the fee, charge or tax is imposed by and passed on to a governmental or
quasi-governmental authority) is strictly prohibited. Also included were terms re-
garding accommodations, destinations, or other goods or services.
The developers promised not to represent that a consumer was selected as a
winner, when in fact the enterprise is simply a promotional scheme to contact pro-
spective customers. Additionally, they agreed not to state false limitations on the
time limit within which they must accept the offer so as not to create a false sense of
urgency.
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by implication.'
Consistent with the position accepted by timeshare developers
summarized above, the Board of Directors of ARDA, on October
21, 1997, adopted by unanimous consent, vacation package inter-
preting guidelines of the ARDA Code of Standards and Ethics,"5
evidencing its commitment to articulating the highest levels of
ethics and professionalism. These guidelines instructed timeshare
developers that any mandatory timeshare tour relating to the sale
of a vacation package must be clearly disclosed to the purchaser
according to applicable law.' If the vacation package includes an
optional or invitational timeshare tour, the tour need not be dis-
closed.0 7 This position is consistent with the voluntary agree-
ments entered into by timeshare developers with various states.
In addition, the ARDA Code of Standards and Ethics provides
clear guidelines to timeshare developers concerning issues such as
urgency, "winner" language, the purchase of the vacation message
(as opposed to a giveaway), unbundling fees, and false affiliations,
among other items.' 8
Furthermore, the timeshare industry has adopted the stan-
dard that it is appropriate to disclose to the consumer that the va-
cation package is being purchased or sold (rather than constitut-
ing a gift or prize). The developer is required to disclose to the
consumer the purpose of a required tour. Essentially, the devel-
oper must represent that the tour would be necessary to purchase
The agreement also included terms indicating that a vacation was reserved for
a consumer (by using a "reservation number"), using a "control number" (unless this
identifier is in fact employed by the mailer for a specific business purpose). They
also agreed to be forthright about the purpose of the offer (by not stating it is to
promote tourism, regulate disbursement of vacation packages, or to generate word
of mouth advertising unless the mailer has a realistic likelihood based on past ex-
perience of generating substantial business from consumer-to-consumer communi-
cations. It was also agreed that any stated percentage of satisfied customers would
be based on reasonable, numerical substantiation. Finally, it was agreed to not im-
ply a relationship with any government agency (either by referring to the documents
as "registered", or by citing the possibility of criminal penalties, or using names of
fictitious agencies).
104 See Lefkowitz v. E.F.G. Baby Prods., Co., 340 N.Y.S.2d 39, 43-44 (App. Div.
1973) (determining whether there has been misrepresentation by implication by exam-
ining the impression the statement would make on the average consumer).
." See ARDA Code, supra note 102, at 68-69.lo See id.
'07 See id. at 68.
1" See id- at 69 (prohibiting conveyance of false sense of urgency and use of
"winner" language when, in fact, the consumer has not won anything).
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the timeshare."9 It is important to note that the tour would be
deemed required as part of the vacation package acquisition if ei-
ther, (i) the consumer must participate in a tour in order to take
advantage of the vacation package offer, or (ii) the tour is offered
to the consumer in such a manner that it may reasonably lead a
consumer to conclude that the failure to attend the tour would ad-
versely affect the consumer receiving the vacation package as rep-
resented and/or result in a reduction of the level of services or
goods which would otherwise be available to such consumer as
part of the purchase.110
VI. STATE AND FEDERAL GUIDELINES
One should be mindful of the requirements generally found in
specific state statutes when soliciting by direct mail that results in
a telephone inquiry to acquire a vacation package.' It is also im-
portant to be aware of the Federal Telemarketing Consumer
Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act". and the applicable telemarket-
ing sales rules adopted by the Federal Trade Commission."'
Each state may have different statutes regulating what may,
or may not, be said in direct mail solicitation. For example, in
North Carolina, a solicitor may not represent that a person has
won anything of value or is the winner of any contest unless cer-
tain conditions are first met.' Use of any language that is in-
'09 See id at 68-69.
110 See id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.111(7)(b) (West 1988) (stating that all
requirements to be fulfilled in order to claim a vacation must be disclosed to the po-
tential purchaser). But see ARDA Code, supra note 102, at 68 (refusing to extend the
code provisions to transactions where a booth is set up for customers to independently
approach, because there is no requirement of attendance at presentation).
... See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.11(5) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring a disclosure
that the purpose of the mailing is to solicit purchasers of timeshares to be promi-
nently stated on advertising material, specifically hotel certificates); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:1131.12(G)(4)(g) (West 1998) (requiring "full disclosure" regarding condi-
tions on the use of vacation certificates); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 221.031 (West
1995) (mandating that an advertiser must disclose the purpose of solicitation before
using a promotion to do so, as well as disclose all the rules and requirements linked
with the promotion).
,1 See 15 U.S.C. § 6106 (1994) (defining as telemarketing any promotion de-
signed to solicit purchases of goods or services by telephone); 15 U.S.C. § 6102
(1994) (regulating telemarketing so as to prohibit abusive or deceptive practices).
11 See 16 C.F.R. § 310.2 (1998) (defining telemarketing as any promotion de-
signed to solicit purchases of goods or services by telephone); 16 C.F.R. § 310.3
(1998) (including as deceptive telemarketing the failure to disclose any require-
ments or restrictions involved with the promotion).
114 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-32 (1994) (requiring that the following conditions be
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tended to lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she has
won a contest, including but not limited to language such as
"Congratulations" or 'You are entitled to receive," are considered
representations governed by the statute." Hence, in any direct
mail piece in a state with a statute similar to the foregoing North
Carolina statute, use of certain language or a representation that
one has won something would be forbidden unless the solicitor
meets the required conditions." 6
Many states also regulate the use of consumers being
"specially selected.""7 In these states, it is generally understood
that it is an unfair and deceptive trade practice to represent that a
person has been specially selected in connection with the sale,
lease, or solicitation of any property. An exception applies when
the selection process is designed to reach a particular type of per-
son and the solicitor uses a source other than telephone directories
or purchased mail lists, and no more than 10% of those considered
are actually selected."' While these types of statutes are founded
upon an effort to avoid deception, they fail to take into account
that purchased mail lists themselves are a source of possible spe-
cial selection. Essentially, the mail lists constitute refined infor-
mation as to why one would be considered a good prospect, as
met: that the recipient of the prize must have been selected by a method in which no
more than 10% of the names considered are selected as winners, the recipient of the
prize must be given the prize without any obligation, and the prize must be deliv-
ered to the recipient at no expense to him within 10 days of the representation).
" See id.
" See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-15-40 (West Supp. 1998) (requiring the solicitor to
disclose the actual retail price of the prize, the actual number of prizes awarded and
the odds of receipt before indicating a person is or could be a winner); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 66-32-133(4) (1993) (making it unlawful for a solicitor to claim a person is
part of a "select group" chosen if it is not true); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6D-4 (1998)
(stating that all material conditions must be disclosed before there is a representa-
tion of a consumer's eligibility to receive a prize).
117 The concept of "special selection" refers to promotional or solicitational ma-
terials sent to a consumer implying, directly or indirectly, that he or she has been
particularly chosen from a larger group of individuals to receive a prize or gift.
118 See MI. GEN. LAWS § 42-61.1-4 (1993) (preventing the use of the term "specially
selected" or the use of language insinuating a special selection, unless "the selection
process is designed to reach a particular type or types or persons"); VA. CODE ANN. §
59.1-418 (Michie 1998) (prohibiting the use of the words "specially selected7 and also
the use of such language that would make a reasonable person assume he had been
specially selected to receive a solicitation); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6D-5 (1998) (mandating
that the use of words indicating a person was specially chosen is prohibited unless a
selective process was actually used).
1999] 239
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
compared to a poor prospect, for ultimate timeshare sales.' The
cost to a marketer of a mail list increases based upon the greater
amount of "refinement."120  Clearly, individuals from respective
prospect lists have been specially selected.
Another example of statutes which govern the mail solicita-
tion would be those statutes which regulate or prohibit the use of
an advertisement which simulates or resembles a negotiable in-
strument.121 In light of these statutes, any direct mail marketing
of a vacation package should avoid the appearance of a negotiable
instrument.
At least as significant as the rules set forth above, any time-
share developer marketing by direct mail sale of vacation pack-
ages resulting in an incoming telephone call from consumers, or
otherwise producing prospects by outbound telephone calls, needs
to understand the specific rules of the Telemarketing Sales Rule
adopted by the Federal Trade Commission. The Telemarketing
Sales Rule prohibits deceptive and abusive practices by telemar-
keters.2
"9 See Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (discussing credit card companies who rank their customers in six groups de-
pending on their spending history, and then deliver this information to solicitors for
targeted marketing); Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)
(speaking of the sale of subscription lists so that direct mail solicitors can make in-
ferences about whether a consumer is a good target for solicitations based on the
materials to which they subscribe); Sandra Byrd Petersen, Note, Your Life as an
Open Book: Has Technology Rendered Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED.
COM. L.J. 163, 171 (1995) (discussing how personal information given for a legiti-
mate purpose, such as applying for credit or insurance, is sold to solicitors in the
form of mailing lists, which can be used to predict whether a consumer is likely to
purchase their product).
1o0 See Robin Cobb, Finding the Right Doormat, MARKING (U.K.), Sept. 25,
1997, at 514, available in 1997 WL 10027843 (stating that the more refined a mail-
ing list is, the more likely the consumers named will respond, but it will also cost
the solicitor more money to obtain); Brad Hoeschen, Search System Narrows List of
Prospects, BUS. J. MILWAUKEE, Jan. 16, 1998, at 8, available in 1998 WL 984895
(discussing how a refined list will save solicitors money since they are not simply
blanketing a city with mailings, however, this saving is balanced against a higher
cost to the solicitor for a more refined list).
121 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-35 (1994) (prohibiting the simulation of checks
and invoices); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-61.1-5 (1993) (prohibiting the simulation of checks
and invoices unless the "writing clearly and conspicuously discloses its true value and
purpose"); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6D-6 (1998) (also prohibiting simulation of checks and
invoices).
122 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (1998) (implementing the Tele-
marketing and Consumer Fraud Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-08 (1994)).
123 See id. § 310.3; id. § 310.4.
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The telemarketing sales rules require the telemarketer to
make certain affirmative disclosures before a customer makes a
payment.2 4 The Federal Trade Commission went to great lengths
to define payment with respect to credit cards.' Specifically, the
Federal Trade Commission addressed the ambiguity of when
payment occurs in credit card transactions. For example, whether
payment occurs the moment the consumer divulges his credit card
number or when the credit card is actually processed. 6 The Fed-
eral Trade Commission states that payment occurs when a cus-
tomer divulges his or her credit card information.' Therefore, "a
telemarketer or seller who fails to provide the disclosures until the
consumer's payment information is in hand violates the Rule."21
The required disclosures by telemarketers include: (a) the to-
tal cost and quantity of the goods or services that are the subject of
the sales offer, (b) all material restrictions, limitations or condi-
tions to purchase, receive, or use the goods or services that are the
subject of the sales offer, (c) disclosure of a seller's refund cancel-
lation exchange or repurchase policies under certain circum-
stances (the rule requires disclosures of refund policies only if the
seller or telemarketer makes a representation relating to such
policy, or if there is a policy of not making refunds), and (d) disclo-
sure of information in connection with prize promotions. 9 The
Federal Trade Commission is specific regarding what must be
disclosed in any prize promotion." The Telemarketing Sales Rule
can be violated by a seller or telemarketer as well as a person who
provides substantial assistance to a rule violator when that person
m See id. § 310.3.
'25 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 43846 (1995).
122 See id.
127 See id.
12 Id.
' See 16 C.F.R. § 310.3.
12o See id The Telemarketing Sales Rule requires:
In any prize promotion, the odds of being able to receive the prize, and if
the odds are not calculable in advance, the factors used in calculating the
odds; that no purchase or payment is required to win a prize or to partici-
pate in a prize promotion; and the no purchase/no payment method of par-
ticipating in the prize promotion with either instructions on how to partici-
pate or an address or local or toll-free telephone number to which
customers may write or call for information on how to participate;
and... [a]ll material costs or conditions to receive or redeem a prize that is
the subject of the prize promotion.
Id. A seller is also prohibited from misrepresenting "[a] seller's or telemarketer's af-
filiation with, or endorsement by, any government or third party organization." Id.
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knows or consciously avoids knowing of the violation. 1 ' Examples
of those who may be found within this category are those who (1)
provide a list of contacts to a seller or telemarketer, (2) provide
certificates or coupons which may later be redeemed for travel, or
(3) provide scripts, advertising, brochures, promotional material or
direct marketing pieces used in telemarketing.12 In outgoing tele-
phone calls, the Telemarketing Sales Rule also requires all tele-
marketers to disclose the following four items in a prompt, clear
and conspicuous manner: "(1) The identity of the seller; (2) That
the purpose of the call is to sell goods or services; (3) The nature of
the goods or services; and (4) That no purchase or payment is nec-
essary to be able to win a prize or participate in a prize promotion
if a prize promotion is offered."' The telephone rules do not apply
to [i] telephone calls in which the sale of goods is not completed
and payment or authorization of payment is not required until af-
ter a face-to-face sales presentation; [ii] telephone calls initiated
by a customer that are not the result of any solicitation by a seller
or telemarketer; [iii] telephone calls initiated by a customer in re-
sponse to an advertisement through any media, other than direct
mail solicitations (with certain exceptions); and [iv] telephone calls
initiated by a customer in response to direct mail solicitations that
clearly and truthfully disclose all information, such as the total
cost to purchase, all material restrictions, the refund policy exist-
ing and the disclosures referred to above relating to any prize
promotion if a prize promotion exists." The Federal Trade
Commission and the Attorney General of each state are author-
ized to enforce the telephone sales rules.3 5
VI. ADDITIONAL APPLICABLE STATUTES
Due to the nature of the timeshare industry, developers must
familiarize themselves with the statutes of other states. These
statutes may require licensing and bonding as well as additional
disclosures.
For example, in the states of Florida,"' California,"7 and
131 See id § 310.3(b).
'32 See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 43852 (1995).
133 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(d).
134 See id. § 310.6.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 6107 (1994) (granting the FTC limited authority and the Attor-
ney General permanent authority to bring criminal contempt actions against violators
of the Telemarketing Sales Rule).
131 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 559.926-.939 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (regulating
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Washington,3 " "sellers of travel" laws exist. These sellers of travel
laws ("SOT Laws") generally require a filing before one can com-
mence selling travel in a respective state.3 9 A seller of travel is
generally defined as a "person, firm, corporation, or business en-
tity who offers for sale, directly or indirectly, ... prearranged
travel, tourist-related services, or tour-guide services for indi-
viduals or groups, including, but not limited to, vacation or tour
packages, or vacation certificates in exchange for a fee, commis-
sion, or other valuable consideration."' Once a vacation seller
meets the statutory definition, applications then need to be filed.
The applications should include marketing pieces and confirma-
tions of how the vacations will be fulfilled.' Sometimes bonds
must be filed in support of the agreement to classify the vacations
as "sold."
Since direct mail solicitations often result in some form of
telephone solicitation, telephone solicitors are required to comply
with telephone solicitor licensing laws. For example, California, 3
Washington,'" and Ohio 45 all have telephone solicitors licensing
trade, commerce and investments in the sellers of travel industry).
127 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17550 (Deering Supp. 1997) (establishing regu-
lations for sellers of travel in order to eliminate unfair sales practices, protect consum-
ers and encourage competition).
'3 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.138.010-.901 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999)
(regulating sellers of travel to protect consumers from deceptive sales practices).
139 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17550.20 (Deering Supp. 1997) (requiring sellers
of travel to file information with the Consumer Law Section at least 10 days prior to
doing business in the state); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.928 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring
sellers of travel to register, pay an annual registration fee, and annually file an affida-
vit); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.138.100 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring sellers of travel to
register with the director of licensing and conspicuously post the registration number
on all advertisements).
10 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.927(10) (West 1997); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
17550.1 (1992) (defining a "sellers of travel" as those who arrange or advertise that
they can arrange air or sea transportation separately or in conjunction with other
travel services).
141 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.9295 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring "submission of
vacation certificate documents").
142 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.929 (West 1997) (requiring "performance bond"
not exceeding $50,000 "if the seller of travel is offering vacation certificates"); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4719.04 (Anderson 1997) (requiring solicitors to obtain surety
bonds before engaging in business activity).
"3 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17511-17511.12 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 1997)
(regulating telephone solicitation to protect consumers from misrepresentation, lack of
information and failure of delivery).
'" See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.158.010-.901 (West Supp. 1999) (protecting
the public from fraudulent telephone solicitation and protecting the telemarketing in-
dustry).
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acts. Generally speaking, these statutes require telephone solici-
tors to be licensed pursuant to the state's licensing laws.'46 These
laws generally require telemarketers to submit written applica-
tions which disclose specific information to the applicable licensing
division.1
47
While most states require a seller of travel or telephone solici-
tor's license, other states require a solicitor of a mini vacation or
vacation package to be a validly licensed travel agent.4 8  While
this may exist, it is not necessarily generally required.
Despite the fact that the sale of the vacation package made
through direct mail and telephone solicitation is not made face-to-
face in the home of the consumer, there are jurisdictions where an
in-home solicitation regulation or rescission period is applicable.
For example, in People v. Toomey" the California Court of Ap-
peals held that telephone sales fall within the definition of "home
solicitations" governed by the Home Solicitation Sales Act. 50 This
145 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4719.01-.99 (Anderson 1997 & Supp. 1997)
(regulating telephone solicitation to protect purchasers from deceptive acts of tele-
phone solicitors and to encourage fair telephone solicitation sales practices).
'" A solicitor may receive inbound telephone calls from consumers in response to
direct mail solicitation or make outbound telephone calls to consumers who have indi-
cated an interest in receiving information.
147 This information typically includes an applicant's social security number, busi-
ness address, prior work history, experience as a telemarketer, criminal history, any
parent or affiliated company, a list of all telephone numbers to used, and the appoint-
ment of an agent for service of process. For examples of disclosure requirements in a
registration statute, see ALASKA STAT. § 45.63.010(d) (Lexis 1998) (requiring telemar-
keters to file a notice of intent including information such as criminal convictions and
administrative determinations of deceptive practices); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.928(1)
(West 1997) (requiring telemarketers to disclose trade names, business locations and
the names, addresses, phone numbers and social security numbers of its owners and
corporate officers); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.138.110 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of sellers of travel along with proof of a
valid business license).
148 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-52-4 (1995) (requiring sellers of travel to be li-
censed travel agents).
149 203 Cal. Rptr. 642 (Ct. App. 1984).
1-o The court stated that the purpose of the Home Solicitation Sales Act "was to
'protect consumers against the types of pressures that typically can arise when a
salesman appears at a buyers home.'" Id. at 650 (quoting Weatherall Aluminum
Prods. Co. v. Scott, 139 Cal. Rptr. 329, 331 (Ct. App. 1977)). The court recognized that,
under the facts of that case, "telephone solicitations do not result in an intimidating
presence of the seller in the buyer's home to the extent found in a door-to-door sale; yet
the same pressure to make an immediate decision arises from such solicitations" Id-;
see also ALASKA STAT. §45.02.350 (Lexis 1998) (defining a "door-to-door sale" as occur-
ring "when the seller personally solicits the sale" and defining "personally" to mean "in
person or by telephone"); ARK. CODE ANN. §4-89-102(1)(c) (Michie 1996) (defining
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case is distinguishable, however, from the usual direct mail solici-
tation, resulting in a telephone call from the consumer to the
seller of the vacation because the consumer initiates telephone
contact with the seller and, therefore, the same "pressure" which
justified applying the Home Solicitation Sales Act in Toomey does
not exist.
Akin to the home solicitation provisions discussed above, a
state may require a solicitor to deliver to the consumer a notice of
rescission of the acquisition of the vacation package. 5' This is a
byproduct of statutes which generally apply to in-home or tele-
phone sales. For example, Vermont has a notification provision.152
In Vermont, the seller must furnish the consumer with a com-
pleted receipt or copy of any contract relating to the sale. The re-
ceipt or contract must include a detachable notice of cancellation.
In addition, the notice should appear in at least ten point boldface
type to clearly alert the purchaser of his right to cancel.'
VII. CONCLUSION
With its potential for large profits, the timeshare industry is
prospering like never before. The expansion of well-established
hotel companies such as Hilton and Marriott, and public compa-
nies into the timeshare industry reflects its tremendous growth.
Because of this potential for hefty profits, developers are spending
more time and money on the marketing of timeshares. This, in
turn, has led to the enactment of much legislation designed to pro-
tect consumers from potential marketing abuses. Timeshare de-
velopers need to be mindful of the myriad of marketing laws which
presently exist in order to create the sound marketing program
necessary to succeed in the timeshare industry.
"home solicitation sale" to include telephone calls to a consumer's residence); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, § 2451a(d) (1993 & Supp. 1998).
' See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454(a) (1993) (establishing the purchasers right
to rescind and cancel a purchase within three days).
152 See id.
1r3 See id.
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